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For several reasons, forces available to a unified commander may not be as readily available in the future. Therefore, a significant importance attaches itself to the selection of forces that he desires to utilize in order to maintain stability in his region. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the alternatives available for this mission in light of their capabilities an other issues.
The scope of the paper is limited to analyzing general background intormtion, then focusing on a specific theater-CINCEUR's Southern Region-addressing potential threats and key assumptions to make the force selection analysis more objective. The alternative force selections are then compared utilizing commitment and resolve, escalation control, power projection capability, organic sustainment and availability (in terms of reaction ti ).
Naval deployments possess qualities which enhance the maintenance of regional stability more effectively and efficiently than other forces, and should therefore be the force pf choice of unified commanders and CINCEUR (in his Southern Region) specifically. It is significant importance attaches itself to the selection of forces that he desires to utilize in order to maintain stability in his region. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the alternatives available for this mission in light of their capabilities and other issues.
The scope of the paper is limited to analyzing general background information, then focusing on a specific theater-CINCEUR's Southern region-addressing potential threats and key assumptions to make the force selection analysis more objective. The alternative force selections are then compared utilizing commitment and resolve, escalation control, power projection capability, organic sustainment and availability (in terms of reaction time).
Naval deployments possess qualities which enhance the maintenance of regional stability more effectively and efficiently than other forces, and should therefore be the f irc! of choice of unified commanders and CINCEUR (in his Southern ieglon) specifically. It is necessary, however, to maintain a broad and balanced spectrum of capabilities through a variety of forces.
i It was through sea power and its -companion"-the power to carry by sea a force that can be thrown ashore wherever desired or needed-that for centuries Britain helped her friends on the Continent to resist aggression, and averted its domination by any single tyrant.'
This concept continues in practice today, and was stated by
Admiral Trost in 1990,
The objectives of the peacetime posture of the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps are to achieve deterrence, meet alliance and treaty commitments, support national diplomatic objectives, and to be ready for the rapid response essential. to deal with any crisis. 2 As events around the world have unfolded in the last two years, dramatic and significant changes have occurred. Many now believe that the Soviet threat has passed. I do not intend to debate the credibility of the current Soviet conventional capabiliticz although they continue to exist through effective modernization programs. Their intent could be debated (and is 1 really unknown), but regardless, they cannot be overlooked as a potential adversary. Moving from a bipolar to a multipolar world has not eliminated problems. As we have seen in the Persian Gulf region, there remains ample opportunity for regional instability without Soviet involvement.
The "peace dividend" has enabled congress to Justify significant military force reductions. Whether this is a wise move or not is irrelevant-it is a fact of life. It is important to note that these force reductions have had no impact on our national military objectives-nor should they. It is the responsibility of the military to help achieve these objectives of:
-deterring military attack against the United States, U.S. allies, and other U.S. interests; and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail.
-encouraging the establishment and strengthening of freedom and democracy around the globe.
-encouraging and assisting U.S. allies and friends in defending themselves against invasion, armed insurgencies, terrorism, or coercion.
-protecting free commerce and ensuring U.S. access to world markets, natural resources, the oceans, and space.
-stemming the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. 3 President Bush outlined a future defense policy to accomplish these objectives in an address at Aspen, Colorado, on 2 August In an article by the current Naval leadership of the United States, the threat was well stated, Clearly, international turmoil, aggression, and conflict are not things of the past. Drives for regional hegemony, resurgent nationalism, ethnic and religious rivalries, drug trafficking, and terrorism are certain to challenge international order during the final decade of this century. Within developing nations, dramatic increases in population and growing dissatisfaction with the perpetual gap between rich and poor will continue to be major causes of unrest and insurgency. 2 While regional incidents continue to occur, it is alarming that many of the third world nations which could become involved in regional conflict are more capable than ever before. They are armed with state-of-the-art weapons systems and have been trained by ourselves, our allies or the Soviets. "The widespread proliferation of advanced weapons-plus a demonstrated willingness to use tnem-will present new challenges to U. S.
interests and military forces. -3 There are no indications that this world situation will improve in the foreseeable future.
Bearing this threat in mind, and with the guidance provided by the President, the unified commanders must seek to achieve regional stability through deterrence, and if deterrence fails, the ability to swiftly defeat an opponent. Here, we are faced with the heart of the problem. Is stability more effectively In the last several decades we have seen the number of countries that host U. S. forces shrink by two-thirds, and the number of installations reduced by 60 percent. The heavy domastic political criticism levied on Prime Minister Thatcher's government for allowing U. C. Air Forc' F-llls based in England to participate in the retaliatory strike on Libya and France's refusal to allow those same aircraft overflight rights are graphic examples of why we must maintain a capability for unilateral action unfettered by foreign constraints when our national interests are at stake. will assume that all forces are equipped with the latest systems and weapons available to them and are trained at equivalent readiness levels (in order to make our analysis more objective).
Finally, let us assume, as a worst case, that all efforts regarding this issue will be unilateral on the part of the U. S. He could also covertly utilize special operations forces, but for the purposes of classification, they will not be addressed here.
If the movement of forces fails to diffuse the situation, then a measured response will be necessary. This considers the capabilities of the different forces, and that will be discussed in detail in the analysis section. A CVBG (and to a much lesser degree, an ATF) is initially in a similar situation. If they are not within range of the target area, they can conduct immediate strikes, but cannot sustain them until the force has closed to within range of the target area.
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Once within range, they can conduct sustained operations for long periods. Additionally, airborne power projection can be supplemented by Tomahawk missile strikes. Normally, these assets are dispersed throughout the Mediterranean. Finally, naval forces possess a limited power projection capability with naval gunfire (which we will consider as an airborne capability here) which may be able to react rapidly because of close proximity to a target area.
CONUS-based Air Force units can project power rapidly, but not immediately, anywhere in the Mediterranean. However, their strikes are not sustainable due to the distances involved with these missions. Therefore, based on the factors considered here, airborne naval forces (including Tomahawk missiles, and, to a lesser degree, naval gunfire) are the most effective forces because they can strike anywhere in CINCEUR's Southern Region and sustain those efforts immediately or shortly thereafter.
As far as ground forces are concerned, both forward deployed 16 and CONUS-based require lift to fight in the Southern Region.
It is difficult to determine which forces can deploy more rapidly since this is very scenario dependent-particularly for the forward deployed forces. However, both of these forces could be more rapid than an ATF, depending on the ATF's location in the
Mediterranean. This is a very subjective and scenario dependent consideration, but I would have to give a slight edge to the airlifted forces. Considering both air and land forces, it is a difficult choice to make since it is so situationally dependent.
Therefore, I will say that for the MOE of availability, in terms of reaction time, the forces are equivalent.
The next area to analyze is that of capabilities. By this I mean the ability to project power wherever necessary in order to either demonstrate the capability to, or actually defeat, hostile forces. As a part of this capability, it is critical to consider organic sustainment since the ability to sustain operations from the outset may be pivotal in diffusing a situation prior to hostilities or before it can escalate.
As discussed earlier, forward deployed Air Force units can Since there are no Army forces routinely deployed in the Southern Region, any Army forces would have to be airlifted in either from the Central Region or CONUS. This presents us with two problems, the first of which is the composition of these forces. Of necessity, they will be light forces with little or no forced entry capability. This is coupled with their extremely limited initial sustainability. There may be situations in which it is desirable to utilize these forces-particularly because of their rapid deployment capability, but it does present some limitations to their employment.
The MAGTF, which is the heart of the ATF, is a small, but give the edge to naval forces. But many of these evaluations are subjective-at least to some degree, and all are very situationally dependent. Are naval forces really better suited to this mission than the others?
History would certainly lead us to believe so. Since World War II, naval forces have been involved in, either by presence or force, every incident in the Southern Region. One could counter that with the fact that this is logical since the preponderance of forces deployed in the region are naval forces. Isn't it more efficient and effective to send a CVBG or ATF off the coast of Libya (1981 and twice in 1986) , Lebanon (1958 Lebanon ( , 1976 Lebanon ( and 1981 or Israel (1956 Israel ( , 1967 Israel ( and 1973 Outside of the territory of our current alliances (where we maintain military forces at bases in foreign countries) or Warsaw Pact territory, 87 percent of the locations around the world at which the U. S. has established a diplomatic presence are within 300 miles of the sea. 3 Also, according to Admiral Trost, Since most of the world's population lives within 50 miles of the sea, our naval power projection capabilities will remain particularly useful in applying U. S. military might at appropriate places and times.
...most of (our interests) are found in littoral areas. 4 This means that a very high percentage of the area in which U. S.
interests are involved are within the reach of our naval forces.
Not only have naval forces historically been the preferred choice to maintain stability, but they are, as I have shown, more effective and efficient in this mission. Therefore, it is my strong opinion that naval deployments are, in fact, the key element to conventional regional deterrence.
22
However, as the only true superpower remaining, we must ensure that we not only utilize naval deployments in this role, but that we also continue to provide our unified commanders with a variety of capabilities with which to ensure deterrence and stability in their areas of responsibility-because each service possesses unique capabilities which enhance those of the others.
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